JPMorgan is the largest U.S. bank and the most profitable of the big ones, earning about 20% on tangible equity. The question for a bank is what return on equity it can sustain and what multiple of book value that justifies. At 2.5 times book, the market already assumes today’s exceptional returns last.
Today’s close against the report’s numbers, updated every weekday. The analysis is as of October 20, 2026; the rating as of October 22, 2026. Both change only when the report is revised.
The excess-return model’s bear-to-bull range, the probability-weighted value, the price and its 52-week range. The copper line marks the base case; the fine dotted line is today’s close.
Written on October 20, 2026, a week after its third-quarter results on October 13. Figures are from the company’s filings and releases unless noted. Not investment advice. The author holds JPM shares.
JPMorgan runs Consumer & Community Banking (Chase branches, cards, mortgages), the Commercial & Investment Bank (lending, investment banking, trading, payments), and Asset & Wealth Management. Deposits are its raw material: cheap, sticky funding it lends and invests at a spread.
Scale is the advantage. It spends more on technology than most competitors earn, and it is the default counterparty for large companies and governments.
Takeaway. A bank is valued on what it earns on its equity, not on cash flow, because debt is its product.
Third-quarter net income was $15.3 billion. Net interest income rose 13% to $27.1 billion; markets revenue rose 15% to $10.3 billion, led by equities (+49%); investment banking fees rose 14%. Expenses grew 12%. Credit was steady: net charge-offs fell to $2.2 billion.
Management guided fourth-quarter NII to about $28 billion and gave a first 2027 view of about $107 billion excluding markets. Jamie Dimon said the bank has roughly $30 billion of excess capital and cut buybacks to $0.7 billion this quarter, preferring to lend it out at good returns.
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | TTM Jun 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $121.6B | $128.7B | $158.1B | $177.6B | $182.4B | $199.4B |
| Net income | $48.3B | $37.7B | $49.6B | $58.5B | $57.0B | $65.1B |
Revenue has risen about 50% since 2022, helped by higher interest rates and the First Republic acquisition in 2023. Return on equity has stayed in the high teens.
CET1, the main regulatory capital measure, was 13.9%, comfortably above requirements. The bank paid $4.4 billion of dividends in the quarter ($1.65 a share). Tangible book value per share is $112.64, up 7% in a year; book value per share is $132.30.
The excess-return model values a bank by how far its return on equity beats its cost of equity: justified price-to-book = (ROE − g) ÷ (cost of equity − g).
| Assumption | Base case | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Sustainable return on equity | 16% | Between today’s 17% and the 17% through-cycle ROTCE target (about 14.5% ROE) |
| Long-run growth | 4.5% | Retained earnings growing the balance sheet |
| Cost of equity | 9.9% | 5.15% Treasury, beta 1.05, 4.5% premium |
| Book value per share | $132.30 | September 30, 2026 |
| Bear | Base | Bull | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Return on equity | 14.5% | 16% | 18% |
| Cost of equity | 10.4% | 9.9% | 9.4% |
| Value per share | $226 | $284 | $368 |
| Probability | 25% | 50% | 25% |
Weighted 25/50/25: $290.
| Cost of equity | 9.0% | 9.5% | 10.0% |
|---|---|---|---|
| Value per share | $338 | $304 | $277 |
Every figure in this valuation comes from one model script, rerun and checked against this page each time the site is built. The XLSX model rebuilds it in live formulas: change any blue input and every year’s cash flow, the bridge to the value, the scenarios and the sensitivity table recalculate.
| To reach today’s price, you need | Instead of |
|---|---|
| A lasting return on equity of about 18% | 16%, and a 17% through-cycle ROTCE target |
| A cost of equity near 9.0% | 9.9% |
That is achievable in good years, as 2026 shows, but it leaves no room for a credit cycle or lower rates.
| Risk | Why it matters |
|---|---|
| Credit cycle | Card losses are at 3.2% and stable; a recession would raise them and require reserves. |
| Lower rates | NII benefits from today’s rates; cuts would squeeze it. |
| Expenses | 2027 costs near $114 billion as the bank invests in technology and branches. |
| Succession | Jamie Dimon’s eventual departure. |
Upside: lighter capital rules releasing the $30 billion of excess capital, and continued strength in markets and investment banking.
JPMorgan earns more on its equity than its peers, and the excess-return model capitalises that. The price needs returns above the bank’s own through-cycle target.
What would change the value: A change to the 16% through-cycle return target, credit losses rising faster than expected, or a move in rates that changes the cost of equity would change the value.
Ranges, not three cases. The expected value is the average of 4,000 runs of this report’s own model, with every input drawn from a range: the base case is the middle, and the bear and bull cases are the 10th and 90th percentiles. Business inputs move together; the discount rate moves on its own. The 25/50/25 weighting in the valuation section gives $290. How the ranges work
Two different questions. The rating is relative: it asks whether the stock is cheaper or dearer than the S&P 500 on the same assumptions. The absolute view asks whether it is worth its price at all: on its own the stock trades above our estimated value, which is 14% below the price.
On the same assumptions every report uses (a 5.15% Treasury yield and a 4.5% equity premium), the S&P 500 itself is worth about 68% of its price. The rating compares each stock with that: Buy if it is at least 15% cheaper than the market on this basis, Sell if at least 15% dearer, Hold in between. It is the same rule for every company, whoever owns it. The rating depends on that assumption: it would be Buy if the index grows 6% a year and Hold at 10%, against 8% here. How ratings work
| Measure | JPMorgan Chase | Industry median | Rank | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue growth, last fiscal year | 2.8% | 5.6% | 5 of 6 | Worse than the median |
| Operating margin | 42.1% | 34.4% | 1 of 6 | Better than the median |
| Price to earnings | 14.0× | 11.3× | 6 of 7 | Worse than the median |
Peers: the 6 other S&P 500 companies in Diversified Banks with complete data (BAC, C, PNC, TFC, USB, WFC). Last twelve months where reported, from SEC filings; prices from the latest close. A lower price-to-earnings ratio ranks higher. These figures update with each data run; the rating does not.
JPMorgan earns more than its peers; the premium is already in the price.
Defend this call: the hardest questions about this report, answered from it.
| What | Figures | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Latest results | $15.3B (Net income, Q3 2026), $5.57 (EPS ($5.75 ex securities losses)), $50.9B (Revenue, +8%), 20% (Return on tangible equity) and others | Q3 2026 results; Earnings call |
| The numbers (five-year table) | Five years of annual figures and the last twelve months | SEC XBRL company facts; latest: 10-K for the period to 2025-12-31, 10-Q for the period to 2026-06-30 |
| Price at writing | $335.26 (close) | Yahoo Finance; the time of the quote is stated beside the price |
| Discount rate inputs | 10-year Treasury 5.15%, equity risk premium 4.5% | Fixed for every report so they can be compared; How ratings work |
| Valuation | Every value, case and sensitivity | This site’s model: XLSX, CSV |
| Checked by hand | 16 figures on October 23, 2026 | All match. Audit log |
| Input | Bear (10th percentile) | Base (median) | Bull (90th percentile) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Return on equity | 14.5% | 16.0% | 18.0% |
| Cost of equity | 10.4% | 9.9% | 9.4% |
| Simulation result | |
|---|---|
| Expected value (average of 4,000 runs) | $289.34 |
| Likely range, 10th to 90th percentile | $240.42 to $343.66 |
| Median | $286.21 |
| Chance the value is above the price | 13% |
| Chance it is cheaper than the S&P 500 | 95% |
Each input is drawn from a split normal: its bear and bull values are the 10th and 90th percentiles, so the two sides can differ. Business inputs share a common factor (correlation 0.6); the discount rate moves on its own. Inputs not listed are held at their base value. How the simulation works.